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iN TI-L;: SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
----------
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
vs. 
Plaintiff and Resp)ndent, ) 
) 
) 




) Defend ant and Appellant. 
APPELLAN~t"~; R ;:PLY BRIEF 
_______ ,_. ____ _ 
AR G lJ -A ENT 
POINT l 
No. 9851 
THE ORAL STATEMENT ADMITTED WAS AS TO 
~\ CONFE~3SION NOT MERELY AN AD:NiLSSION. 
Respondent in its brief at page 6 cites the case of 
State v. }11asato Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 126 P. 2d 1047 
(1942) in support of the proposition that the oral 
statement admitted into evidence, which appellant 
claims as error in Point 1 of his brief, was not a 
confession as claimed by appellant but rather merely 
an ad1nission. The Karumai case does not support 
seems holds at most 
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that no prelin1inary showing of voluntariness is 
necessary before admitting an admission into 
evidence, where the admission is not too compre-
hensive. Further, the court held that there was no 
showing that the statement was involuntarily made 
and thus the conclusion that the statcm ent was an 
admission was not necessary to the decision of 
that case. 
In the present case, even assuming the state-
ment to be an adn1ission, it is much too compre-
hensive to be governed by the Karumai case. 
Further, the Karumai case was decided before the 
case of State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P, 2d 178 
(1943). The Karumai case appears to have only 
considered the rule that the state need only 
E:stablish, fl'itna facie case of VOluntariness, 
That Crank case however imposes the obligation 
upon the court to consider all evidence of volun-
tariness before a confession is adn1itted. Although 
the Crank case does not specifically say that this 
new rule shall also apply to adn1is sions, the rc asoning 
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be1dnd it clearly dictates that it should apply to a 
statement like the one in the pres m t case. 
The alleged statement in question (R. 79) speci-
fically admits every element of second degree 
burglary, except it doesn't contain the statement 
that defend;.:.Llt intended to corn mit 1 arc eny or a 
felony when he entered the bui.lding. However, the 
statement clearly implies thJ.t element and is con-
sistent only with that conclusion. It is thus a confes-
sion. But even assu1.ning i:h ,_t lack of express words 
of intent renders the state.rr:ent an admission, it must 
be treated like a confessic •- under the reasoning of 
the Crank case. Otherwise, even torture could be 
nsed upon a r1efendant up to the point where he ad-
mit ted all elements, but one, and that element one 
which can legally be implied or inferred. See 
State v. Hopkins ll Utah 2d 3 63, 359 P 2d 48 6 (19 61). 
Further, defendant in an out of court hear:lng 
may be able to establish that he in fact did confess 
to the r.nissing element, thus bringing the alleged 
stat ---- the rule of the Crank 
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case a .d then further establish that the ·whole 
confession we1.s i11V0luntary. To require defendant 
to establish before a jury that his confession was 
complete in order Lo show that it was not an admis-
s ion, would r eq uir e defend ant to prosecute him s c lf. 
POINT 2 
/.STATEMENT OF COUNSEL IS NOT THE 
EQUIVALENT OF AN OUT OF COURT HEARING. 
Respoi1dent in Point 1. B. of its brief raises 
the rat11er startling point that since c_:ppellant,s 
attorney indicated to the c-ouTt what the testimony 
would be at the out of court hearing on the question 
of voluEtariness and that t:he couTt then deter1nined 
to submi~ the evidence to the jury, t~1.at appellant 
h2.; had all he is entitled to. If this is the law, 
then in effect it allows the court to say that he 
would r. A believe appellant if he tes~.ified, so he 
1night e1.s \Jell not '·"aste ti.n1e. This is not the law. 
Under the rule of the Crank case, supra, the trial 
judge is required to deterrninc for hirnsel£ whether 
or not he be lievc s the confession to be voluntary . 
. : !l t} urt says: 
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"'.L'his does not mean merely a prima facie 
showing but rr1ust satisfy the mind of the court 
iil the Fght of ,1.ll the evi·lence giv,:::n by b: .th 
state a 1.d cbC~nse.'' 
Although the Crank caso says the court decides 
the question as a matter of ~.aT,'~', the court is never-
theless to exercise its honest judgment as to whether 
the court finds the confession to be voluntary and 
not whether it finds that sorr1e one else could rea-
sonably find it to be voluntary, otherwise a "prima 
facie showing" would be enongh bee a use by_ defini-
tion it means enough evidence to sustain a finding 
of voluntariness. 
POINT 3 
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE COURT'S 
PHOCEDURE WITH REGARD TO THE ALLEGED 
CONFESSION WAS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR. 
Respondent in Poirtl. C. of its brief raises the 
point that appellant was not sufficiently clear, at page 
72 of the record, that he was objecting to the court's 
procedure with regard to the alleged confession. It 
is subinitted that a fair analysis of the transcript 
indicate •.> that appellant v1 as o bj ec ting to the court's 
p1·oc: ·-::-:-::-:::==-,:~:: .. ,;sian and the search 
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and seizure question. 
POINT 4 
A MOTEL 11ANAGER DOES NOT HAVE 
AUTHORITY TO AUTHORIZE A SEARCH OF 
A 110TEL R0011 WHICH HAS BEEN RENTED 
TO TENANTS. 
Respondent, at page 12 of its brief, cites Varon, 
Searches and Seizt:tres, Vol. l, p.439 (1961) as authority 
for its appcarent position that the motel manager 
was authorized to allow the search. At page 441 of 
the sarne volu .~.-;e it is said: 
"An in-nkeeper or person running a rooming 
house or hotel certainly has the right to invite a 
police officer upon the pre1nises, but does not 
have the right to pernd~ the police officeJSto 
enter upo-r1 the roc1n or premises which may be 
leased to a hotel guest, roomer or patron. By 
so doing, the roo1ning house owner or hotel 
D1Rnager or innkeeper in effect waives the per-
sonal constil:utional rights o{ f!1e hotel guest, 
roomer or patron against unreasonable search 
and seizure.'' 
Thus, to hold that a rnotel Lnanager has given valid 
clutb:-'• 'ty to consent to a f.c<>.l~ch is to hold that the 
tenants have waived their ''·pe rs anal constitutionn] 
rights". Waiver is an affirmative defense \vhich 
must be pleaded and proved. Likc . .1ise, in a crin1inal 
cas< .. ~ly on a waiver, it. 
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should have the dut; of proving a waiver. Appellant 
is not :_;eeking affirrnative relief in the sense of 
tryinr; to obtain the return of the property. The 
unlawful search and seizn ,:e was established 
unless there was a waiver. The State must prove 
E~; case and must prove a waiver if it claims such, 
and all of the ele1nents thereof, including knowledge. 
The admission of the St .te's exhibits w:1s highly 
prej _tdicial to defendant, especially admission of 
the pistol because of the serial number. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus despite new n1 aterial raised by respondent 
in its brief, it clearly appears that prejudicial error 
was committed, and the conviction and sentence of 
the trial court should be reversed. 
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